On Inequality Comparisons by Fields, Gary S. & Fei, John C. H.
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Discussion Papers Economic Growth Center 
5-1-1974 
On Inequality Comparisons 
Gary S. Fields 
John C. H. Fei 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series 
Recommended Citation 
Fields, Gary S. and Fei, John C. H., "On Inequality Comparisons" (1974). Discussion Papers. 210. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/210 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an 
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, 
please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
Box 1987, Yale Station 
New Haven, Conn. 06520 
CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 202 
ON INEQUALITY COMPARISONS 
Gary S. Fields and John C.H. Fei 
April 1974 
Note: Center Disc~ssion Papers are preliminary materials circulated 
to stimulate disGussion and critical comment. References in 
publications to Discussion papers should be cleared with the 
authors to protect the tentative character of these papers. 
Portions of this research were financed by the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development under RP0/284, How­
ever, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of 
IBRD. 
O. Introduction 
Is one distribution (of income, consumption, or some other economic 
1
variable) among families or individuals more or less equal than another? 
Despite_ the seeming straightforwardness of this question, there has been 
and continues to be considerable debate over how to go about finding the 
answer. One can adopt either an ordinal or a cardinal approach to in­
equality comparisons. If A and Bare two alternative income distribution 
patterns, an ordinal approach specifies whether A is more equal than B 
while a cardinal approach requires the additional specification of how 
much more equal A is than B. 
The traditional approach has been cardinal. Dating back at least to 
1905 and the classic work of Lorenz an<l Gini, economists have proposed to 
compare distributions by means of sunnnary measures such as a Gini coeffi­
cient, variance of logarithrns, and the like. Often these indices seem to 
have been used more because of their existence than because of a careful 
examination of the properties they have. The additional information (i.e., 
how much more equal) is not only a source of controversy but also redundant 
0 0 
o nk • h inequa ity o istri utions. 
2
f or purposes f ra ing t e • 1· f two d b • 
In recent vears, a number of writers have reversed the direction of 
inquiry. 3 The new approach is to start by specifying as axioms a relatively 
1rhroughout this paper, we shall talk in terms of income distributions 
among families. All results apply, however, without modification to comparisons 
of inequality in the distribution of any quantifiable economic magnitude. 
'-cardinality of inequality is redundant and controversial for purp.oses 
of ranking of distributions in the same sense that cardinal utility is re­
dundant and controversial in the analysis of consumer choices. See Hicks 
(1939, p. 17). 
3 · Much of this literature is summarized in Sen (1973). 
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small number of properties which a "good" index of inequality should have 
and then examining which if any of the various measures now in use satisfy 
those properties. The key issue is the reasonableness of the postulated 
properties. Work to date has shown the barrenness of the Pareto criterion~l 
but bas not yet sought ~o develop an alternative axiomatic structure. The 
primary purp:,se of this paper is to contribute to such a development. 
We shall postula-.:e three axioms: scale irrelevance, symmetry, and 
desirability of rank-preserving equalization. The axiomatic system so 
constructed· is intentionally incomplete. The advantage of an incomplete 
system is that we can then show that several indices in current use (the 
Gini coefficient, coefficient of variation, Atkinson index, and Theil index) 
satisfy our axioms.' This lend~ support to their reasonableness. However, 
they differ in ways which lie outside the scope of our axioms. Hopefully, 
future ·research will uncover additional axioms which will narrow down this 
incompleteness. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Three axioms which have been 
utilized in various contexts for mequality comparisons will be introduced 
in Section l. We will then use these axioms to investigate and strengthen 
previous results on the consistency of alternative orderings in terms of 
Lorenz domination (Section 2). Then we design a general method to show 
1ror an axiomatic development of the Pareto criterion, see Sen (1973). 
2Indices of inequality, including those mentioned above, are cardinal 
measures which naturally introduce a pre-ordering. Thus, rJgorously, it is 
the pre-ordering R induced by the index which satisfies our axioms. 
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that the orderings induced by many of the popular indices satisfy the first 
three axioms (Section 3). The concluding section reviews the highlights of 
this type of approach to inequality comparisons and suggests directions for 
future research extending these results. 
1. Three Axioms for Inequality Comparisons 
Suppose there are n families in an economy whose incomes may be re­
presented by the non-negative row vector 
(1.1) X = (Xl x2 ••• Xn) ~ 0 
in the non-negative orthant of then-dimension income distribution space n+. 
A point inn+ is a pattern of income distribution. In this paper, we shall 
exclude the origin (o o ••. 0) (i.e., when no family receives any income) from 
n+. The object of inequality comparisons between two such patterns is to be 
able to say that one is more or less equal than the other. More specifically, 
we wish to introduce a complete pre-ordering
1 of all points inn+, i.e., a 
binary relation "G" d~fined on ordered pairs inn+ satisfying the conditions 
of comparability and transitivity: 
(1.2) (a) Comparability. For any X and Yin n+, exactly one of the 
following is true: . 
(i) XGY ... in which case we write X,,_Y and read "Xis 
more equal than Y" 
' 
(ii) YGX ••• in which· case we write Y>-X and read "Y is more 
equal than X" 
(iii) XGY and YGX • • • in which case we write X = Y and read 
"X and Y are equally unequal." 
i same as11ntuitively,. . a complete pre-order ng has exactly the meaning 
the ranking of commodity bundles by ordinary (ordinal) indifference curves in 
consumer analysis. 
(b) Transitivity. XGY and YGZ implies XGZ. 
From now on, we shall denote a complete pre-ordering by R. 
We now introduce three properties which we shall propose as axioms 
for inequality comparisons. Not only do these seem reasonable to us but 
in addition they have been used by previous writers on inequality. 
First, suppose two distributions X and Y are scalar multiples of 
one another: 
aY ), a> O.n 
Because inequality in the distribution of income and the lev2l of income 
enter as separate arguments into judgments of social well-bein8, it would 
seem reasonable and desirable for comparisons of inequality to be independent 
of the level of income. For this reason, we require that the two distributions 
X and Yin (1.3) be rank~d as equally unequal.
1 Hence, we postulate: 
Al. Axiom of Scale Irrelevance. X = aY (a> 0) implies X = Y. 
This axiom allows us to normalize all distributions X inn+ accord.in~ to the 
fraction of income received by each family: 
8 )] where
n 
8i =Xi/ (X1 + X2 + ••
• + Xn) for i = 1, 2, ••• , n. 
The totality of all such normalized patta:-ns, n°, is the subset of points 
+








1Following Atkinson (1970), we would note that this condition is analogous 
to constant relative inequality aversion. For further applications of this notion 
to inequality comparisons, see also the papers by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) 
and Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett (1973). 
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Axiom 1 assures us: 
Lennna 1.1. If R is first defined on nc, then it can be extended 
+
uniquely to O • 
Next, suppose the elements in one vector X are a permutation of the 
elements of Y, i.e., the frequency distributions of income are the same 
but different individuals receive the income in the two cases. On the 
principle of treating all individuals or families as the same with regard 
to income distributions, these two patterns can be characterized by the same 
degree of inequality. Hence~ we state: 
1Axiom of Symmetry. If (i1 
, i 2 , ••• , in)
 is any permutation ofA2. 
• • • t n), then (Xl x2 ... X) = (X. x. X. ). 
n 1 1 1 2 l. n 
••• , i*) be a particular permutation of (1, 2, ••• , n) • Then those 
n 
... e ) in nc which satisfy the condition 
n 
(1.s) ·e~ < e~ < ••• < e* 
l.l. - l._ - -l ~ n 
c· 
comprise a t-ank-preserving subset of O • There are altogether n! such rank-
preserving subsets. Suppose R is defined for any one of them. Then A2 
allows us to extend it uniquely to the entire set nc and, by Lemma 1.1, to 
the full income distribution space n+. For convenience, we shall work with 
1A2 is sometimes referred to as the axiom of anonymity in the literature 
[see Sen (1973)]. Sen also includes an illuminating discussion highlighting the 
conflicts between A2 and a Benthamite utilitarian approach to social judgments 
(in which social welfare is taken as the sum of individual utilities). 
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Denote the corr.espond­
~he permutation with the natural order (1, 2, ••• , n).
 
ing rank-preserving subset as o0 , wh
ich includes all points satisfying the 
conditions 
(1.7) 81 -< 82 -











will be referred to as the monotonic rank-preserving
 set. Al and A2 allow 
us to state the following: 
Under Al and A2, if R is first defined on the monot
onic
Lemma 1.2. 
rank-preserving set o0 , then it ca
n be extended uniquely to n
+• 
Notice from Lemma 1.2 that after postulating Al.and 
A2, we can restrict 
our search for "reasonable" properties to the space n0 • 
Next, let X and Y be two altern~tive distribution in
 n
0 
such that X 
.is obtained from Y by the transfer of a positive amo
unt of income h from a 
< j. We shall write X = E(Y)relatively rich family j to a poorer family i, i 
and s·ay that X is obtained from Y by a rank-preservi
ng equalization. For a 
particular pair i, j (i <j), there is a maximum amou
nt which can be transfer­
red if the rank is to be preserved. Formally, 
X = E(Y) if for someDefinition. Rank-Preserving Equalization. 
i,j (i<j) and h>O, 
(1. 8) (a) ¾ = y fork f i ,j tk 
xi =Yi +h, 
- h, where:xj = Y.J 
If j = i + 1, h < 1/2 (Y. - y.);(b) l.·) 
If j > i+l, h 
-










Example 1. Rank-Preserving Equalization. 
Let Y = (.01 .02 .04 .06 .07 .10 .70) and suppose the six
th family 
Then the maximum rank-preservingis to transfer income to the second family. If this amount is trans-
amount of transfer is min (Y3 -
Y2, 
Y6 - Y5
) = .02. 
fered, the new distribution X =E(Y) = (.01 .04 .04 .06 .07 .08 .70). 
For any h > .02, the second and third families will switch rank and the 
transfer would not b~ ran~-nreserving. Suppose instead that the sixth family 
were to transfer a positive amount of income to the fifth family. The 
maximum amount that could be transferred without reversing the rank is 
(Y6 - Y5)/2 ~ .015 a
nd for such a transfer the new distribution is 
X = E(Y) = (.01 .02 .OlJ. .06 .085 .085 .70). As before, the transfer of
any larger amount would not be rank-preserving. Although this examole 
illustrates rank-prese!"V'ing equalizations in n , a similar definition 
will be stated on n+ later. O 
The next axiom which we shall introduce is: 
A3. Axiom of Rank-Preserving Equalization. In n0 , if X = E(Y), the
n XrY. ·
..
The intuitive iustification for this axiom is simply that it -
is reasonable to regard as more equal a distribution which can be derived 
from mother by a richer person giving a part of his income to -a poorer 
person. 2 Definin~ thP. perfect equality point as t = (1/n 1/n ••• 1/n), any 
income distribution point X in n0 can 
be transformed into t by a finite 
sequence of rank-preserving equalizations.
3 Thus A3 and the transitivity of 
the ordering imply: 
Lemllla 1.3. t = (1/n 1/n 1/n) >- X for all 
The proof is immediate. 
1Precedent for this axiom dates back at least to Dalton (1920), who 
called this the "principle of transfers." 
'Note the importance of rank-preservation in this axiom. With re­
ference to the above example, suppose contrary to our construction that the 
· sixth individual transferred Y. - Y. = .08 to the second individual. Then
J l.
each would wind up with the other's original income and, by the Axiom of 
Symmetry (A2), the new situation would be characterized by the same degree 
of inequality as the old. 
3rhis assertion is easily proven by constructing a sequence of transfers 
from families above the mean to those below. 
J 
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Notice that A3 has been introduced only
 on n0• Suppos
e now we intro­
Bv Lemma 1.2, R can be extended
duce an Ron On satisfying all three ax
ioms. 
uniquely to the entire income distribut
ion space n.+ It is clear that the 
property of A3 is automatically extende
d. Fonnally: 
Let X and Y be two patterns of income d
istribution in
Definition. 
We shall say that Xis obtained from Y 
by a rank preserving equalization,n+. 
in notation X = E(Y), if 
l 
X and Y belong to the same rank preserv
ing subset
a) 
Xis obtained from Y by the transfer of a
 positive amount of
b) 
= X - h) to a
income h from a relatively rich family
 (e.g. Yq q 
+ h) for Y > Y.relatively poor family (e.g. Yp 
= X
p q p 
Notice that X = E(Y) is now defined for t
he entire irtcome distribution space 
n+. However, this definition coincides
 with the previous definition (1.8 a,b
) 
where both X and Y belong to n0~
 Thus 
If R is first defined on the monotonic r
ank-preserving
Lemma 1.~. 
set n0 satisfying Al-A
3, the unique extension of R ton+ also
 possesses the 
property of desirability of rank prese
rving equalization, i.e., if X=E(Y) th
en 
- To show this is so, we requireAl-A3 constitute an axiomatic system. 
that the axioms be consistent (i.e., the
re exists an ordering satisfying all 
three axioms) and independent (i.e., ther
e exist orderings satisfying each 
pair of axioms but not the third). We il
lustrate these ideas in example 2 
below. 
t if y. < y < ••• <Y. then1ror some permutation i 1 12 ... i -1nn 1 1- i 
2
< X <X ... <X. •
- L -i - l. 
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Example 2: A Two Person Economy 
Suppose there are two individuals with non-negative incomes x1 and x2• 
The incane distribution space Q+ is the positive quadrant of Figure 1 exclud­
ing the origin. The Axiom of Scale Irrelevance (Al) corresponds to linear 
!so-inequality rays emanating from the origin. The Axiom of Symmetry (A2) 
requires that the iso-inequality rays be symmetric about the 45° line. Lemma 
1.1 allows us to confine our attention to the line AB rather than the entire 
~ositive quadrant. There are 2! = 2 rank preserving subsets, n (1,2) = il0 
(represented by the line segment B~) and 0(2,1) (represented by A~), sep~rated 
by the perfect equality point~- Lemma 1.2 lets us limit our attention further 
to line segment B~ satisfying x 2. x • The Axiom of Rank-Perserving Equaliza­
tion (A3) requires that starting
1 from2 an initial point Yon B$, when the richer 
family's income is reduced and the poorer family's raised, the new point X be 
preferred to Y (X >- Y). Graphically, this occurs when X is closer to ~ than 
Y. For example, we can define X rY when the distance 1$-Xl<l~-Y!. This 
determines a pre-ordering Ron B~ which can be extended symmetrically to A~ 
and projectively to the entire non-negative quadrant. This example shows that 
Al-A3 are consistent.l 
To show independence, we must give examples of orderings which satisfy 
two of the axioms but not the third~ If the iso-inequality rays of Figure 1 
were replaced by a set of non-linear symmetric (and symmetrically indexed) 
curves such as those depicted in Figure 2, Al would be violated although A2 
and A3 would be satisfied. Next, with the linear iso-inequality rays of Figure 
1. define the ordering on the line segment B~ as be=ore, but now for a given 
k > i, for any point X' on line segment A~, define X' ~ X for X on B$ if the 
distance jt-X'I = K 1~-xl. Then Al and A3 are satisfied and A2 is violated. 
Finally, for Figure 1, on B~ (and symmetrically on A~), define Y >- X when 
the distance I$-YI< I<ti-XI - Then Al and A2 are satisfied and A3 is violated. 
Thus, the three axioms are independent. 
2. Inequality Comparisons: Zones of Ambiguity and·Lorenz Domination 
In the last section, we showed that if we postulate a set of "reason­
able" axioms for Ron n0 , then R can be extended from n to the entire income0 
distribution space n+. We have not as yet considered whether the three axioms 
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are sufficient to allow us to compare any two points X,Y inn+ according to 
the comparability condition (1.2.a). A noteworthy feature of the two person 
case introduced above is that our three axioms do have this power. However, 
this is not true for n ~ 3. In this section, therefore, we examine when in­
equality comparisons can or cannot be made using Al-A3. 
A. Zones of Ambiguity 
We shall now show that there are well-defined ranges in which in­
equality comparisons can be made using Al-A3 alone and other well-defined 
zones of ambiguity where comparisons cannot be made without further specifi­
cation of the rules of ordering. We begin by illustrating these relationships 
for the case n = 3 •. 
Example 3: A Three Person Economy (n = 3) 
We illustrate zones of comparability and ambiguity in the three person 
case by relying on a property of an equilateral triangle (ABC in Figure 3), 
namely, that the sum of the perpendicular distances to the sides from any 
point Z (zz1 + ZZ + zz3) is the same for all points in t
he triangle and 
equal to AD. If AD= 1 (i.e., has unit distance), the point set bounded by 
ABC represents nc for n = 3. The perpendicular bisectors AD, BE, and CF 
partition nc into 3! = 6 rank-preserving subsets (n(l,2,3), n(2,l,3), ••• ) 
according to (1.6). The monotonic rank-preserving subset n0 ~ n (1,2,3) is 
depicted as the lower right region DC4>, where ~ is the perfect equality point. 
For any arbitrary point Y in n0 , the rest of
 the region can be 
partitioned into six zones I-VI according to the direction of income transfers 
needed to go from Y. A single rank-preserving transfer, holding one person's 
income constant, is depicted as a movement along one of the three auxiliary 
lines_a1b1
, a 2b2 , a3b3 
parallel to the sides of the triangle passine through Y. 
For instance, points along a1
b
1 
correspond to a single rank-preserving equali­
zation or disequalization involving the second and third families holding 
family l's income constant. All other points in n0 are obta
ined from Y_ by 
a combination of rank-preserving equalizations or disequalizations. 
The set of points in Zone I and II are denoted by Y*. Any point in Y* 
can be obtained from Y by a finite sequence of rank-preserving equalizations. 
For ex.ample, we can transform Y into the point U in three steps through the 
points a1 
and T, where the line a 1
T parallels AB and the line TU parallels AC. 
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./ 
Thus, by A3 and the transitivity of R, X >-Y for every X in Y*. Similarly, 
denote the set of points in Zones IV and V by Y_,.; then Y>- X for every 
X in Y~. Finally, the set of points in Zones III and VI are denoted by M* 
and M*Arespectively. A point such as Qin M* can be obtained from Yin two 
steps: (i) a rank-preserving equalization from Y to W, and (ii) a rank­
preserving disequalization from Wto Q. A3 tells us that Wis more equal 
than Y (as income is transfered from the middle income to the poor family) 
and Q is•less equal than W (as income is transfered from the middle income 
to the high income family). These zones (M* and M*) might then be thought 
of as "zones of ambiguity" (relative to Y), for without additional specifi­
cation of the relative weights we wish to give to the respective income 
transfers, our axioms Al-A3 are insufficient to tell us which distribution 
(Y or Q) is the more equal. The transfers in these six cases are summarized 
in Table 1. 
B. Lorenz Domination 
The ideas in example 3 will now be generalized to n0 for the gen
eral 
We shall also establish that there is a direct one-to-onen person case. 
correspondence between the zones of ambiguity and the more familiar concept 
of Lorenz domination, which we examine below. 
The first concept we need to introduce is a sequence of equalizations 
from a given point Y £ n0 according to
 the following definition: 
Xis obtained from Y by a finite sequence of equalizations,Definition. 
X = T(Y), when 
Starting from a given point Y, we can define three sets Y*, Y*, and Mas 
follows: 
(2.2) (a) Y* ={XIX= T(Y)}, 
(b) y* = {XIT(X) = Y}, 
(c) M = n0 - Y*UY*. 
Y* is the set of all points in n0 obtained fr
om Y by a sequence of equalizing 
transfers, while Y* includes those points in n0 from which a
 sequence of 
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transfers as the transfer of income from a relatively poor to a relatively 
rich family, in which case Y* is the set of all X which can be obtained from 
Y by a sequence of disequalizing transfers. The set M contains all other 
points of n0 • 
It follows directly from (2.2.c) that the set M contains all p~ints 
which are not unambiguously comparable with Y under Al-A3. A point Zin M 
can always be transformed into Y by a finite sequence of rank-preserving 
transfers. However, any such sequence necessarily involves at least one 
equalization and at least one disequalization---which is why Z cannot be 
compared with Y. The theorem we prove below, Theorem 2.1, implies that the 
Lorenz curves of Zand Y necessarily cross each other. 
Another concept we need is Lorenz-domination. For two points X and 
~he Lorenz Curve of Xis said to dominate that of Y according toYin n ,
0 
the following definition: 
Definition. X Lorenz-dominates Y (in notation, LX ~ Ly) when 
(2.3) (a) +Y. 
J 
for j = 1,2, ••• , n-1 
Cb) x + x + ••• +X.1 2 J 
Notice that 
n n 
(2.4) t x. = t Y. = 1 in n0. 3. 1i = 1 i = 1 
In other words, one distribution Lorenz-dominates another if the Lorenz 
Curve of the first distribution never lies below that of the second and lies 
above it at least one point. 
-16-
\ 
The basic theorem of this section is: 
Theorem 2.1. X £ Y* if and only if LX ~ Ly• 
Y*,
Thus, the_ Lorenz Curve of Y is dominated by
 the Lorenz Curves of all X £ 
dominates those of X £ Y*, and crosses those 
of X £ M, i.e., neither dominates 
the other. 
The necessary condition of the theorem (i.e
., XE Y* implies that the 
Lorenz curve of X dominates that of Y) is a 
well-known result.
1 The suf­
ficient condition of the theorem states tha
t whenever the Lorenz curve of 
X dominates that of Y (i.e., LX ~ Ly), X can b
e obtained from Y by a sequence 
This sufficient condition, whenof rank-preserving equalizatiomwithin n0 • 
proved, along with A3 and the transitivity 
of R, will allow us to conclude 
This may be summarized as :that for all X in Y*, X >- Y. 
Under A3, for X, Y in n0 , LX ~ Ly 
implies X >- Y.
Corollary 2. 2. 
The proof of the sufficient condition, whic
h requires the construction of a 
sequence of rank-preserving equalizations w
ithin n0 when ( 2
. 3) is satisfied ,2 
will be given after the theorem is illustrate
d for ·the case n=3. 
1see Atkinson (1970), Rothschild and Stiglit
z (1973), ~nd Dasgupta, 
Sen, and Starrett (1973). 
2Rothschild and Stiglitz,have proven that wh
en the Lorenz Curve of 
X dominates that of Y, it is possible to co
nstruct a sequence of transfers 
which may or may not be rank-preserving, i.e
., they may move out of and back 
into n0• The_sufficie
nt condition which· we shall prove in the ~e
xt is a 
stronger version requiring that such a seque
nce be rank-preserving and stay 
within n0•. 
-17-
Example 4. Illustration of Theorem 2.1 in the Three Person Case. 
The equilateral tria.~gle ABC of Example 3 is reproduced in the left­
hand side of Figur7 4-. • For a given point Y in n0 , th~ sets M~'= 
and M~•: a:e now 
shaded. AD has unit distance, so we construct tne unit square CGEF beside 
the triangle. The vertical lines pq and st mark off the thirds of the unit 
c;listance on the horizontal axis. For the income distribution pattern Y, we 
can now·construct its Lorenz curve in the unit square by the following 
procedure. The point d1 (on
 pq) has the satr.e vertical distance as Y, and 
thus qd1 is
 the income of the poorest family. Next from the point Y, locate 
point Z (on AC) by extending the line a 2bry (para
llel to AB). The sum of the 
incomes of the first two families equals the vertical distance ZW. We can 
then locate the point d2 (on st) w
hich has the same vertical distance as z. 
The Lorenz curve of Y, Ly, then passes through d1 and d
2" 
If X is a point in Y*, its Lorenz curve, LX., constructed by the same 
rule, will lie above and therefore dominate Ly • (This is because e1 
is higher than a1 and e 2 higher than d2 as long a
s Xis in Y*.) Similarly, 
the Lorenz curve of any point in Y* will be dominated by Ly• Finally, the 
Lorenz curve of any point in the shaded regions M* and M~': will cross Ly from 
above and below respectively. 
C • . Proof of the Sufficient Condition of Theore~ 2.1 
The sufficient condition of Theorem 2.1 holds that whenever X 
Lorenz-dominates Y, there exists a sequence of rank-pres~rving equalizations 
leading from Y to X. In order to prove the validity of this part of the 
theorem, we must produce a rule for finding the necessary sequence. Let us 
first illustrate the procedure for a simple numerical example. 
Example 5. Illustration of Sequence of Rank 
Preserving Equalizations 
Suppose we have two distributiow X and Yin no:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
X = (.010 .020 .030 .040 .oso .060 • 070 .080 .090 ~sso), 
Y = (.005 .016 .030 .045 .052 .055 .068 .070 .oao .570) 
. Let their difference be denoted by the vector 
- - ----
-18-
+.010 +.010 -.029)d=X-Y= (+.005 +.004 0 -.oos -.002 +.005 +.002 , ..,_ .,.,,., 
D3 D4Dl D2 
= +.009 s2 = -.007 · s3 =+.027 s4 =-. 02~Sl 
That X Lorenz dominates Y may be seen by observing that the cumulative value 
of X must be no less than the cumulative value of Y, or equivalently, the 
cumulative value of d must be non-negative. This can be more readily verified 
when the positive d. and the negatived. are grouped up separately as shown. 
The Lorenz dominatiin can be seen from ihe fact that 
The following sequenc~ of rank-preserving equalizations would convert Y into X: 
(i) Take .010 from person 10, give to person 9; 
(ii) .010 10, 8; 
. (iii) .002 10; 7; 
(iv) .005 10, 6; 
(v) .002 10, 2; 
(vi) .002 4, 2; 
(vii) .003 4, 1; 
. (viii) ·.002 5, 1. 
The reader may easily verify that each equalization is in fact rank-preserving, 
so that Y is transformed into X entirely within n0• 
·To infer a general rule for rank-preserving equalizations from Example 5, 
given any two distributions X and Yin n0 , let thei
r difference be denoted by 
(2.5) (a) d = (d1 a2 ••• dn) = (X1 - Y1 x2 - Y2 •.• Xn - Yn) 
(b) I d. = O. 
l. 
Given (2.5.b), then elements of d can be partitioned consecutively into r 
subsets (D D2 ••• D) 
according to the following rules:
1 r . -
(2.6) (a) Every d. belongs to one D•• (Jointly exhaustive} 
l. J 
(b) If d. £ D. and d £ D, then j < q implies i < p. 














3 3 3 
Figure 4 
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(c) All d. £ D. are non-positive or non-negative [D. is called 
l. J J 
positive (or negative) according to the signs of the di in o .• ] 
J 
{Sign preserving) 
(d) .The first element of o2 , n , ••• , Dr is non-zero. 3 
(e) The D. alternate in sign.
J 
It can be easily shown, as in Example 5, that the partition is unique. 
Furthermore, if X ¢ Y, then there is at least one strictly positive di and 
one strictly negative d.. Thus,
J 
(2.7) If X ¢ Y, r > 2. 1 
We can also define 
(2.8) s. = d. for j = l, ... , r 
J J. 
with the properties 
·· (2.9) (a) S. ~ o, j = 1, 2, ••• , r 11 . J 
(b) s1 , s2 , ••• , Sr alternate in sign 
r n 
(c) 1: S. = t d. - O. 
j = 1 J i = l 1 
Note how these conditions determine the groupings in Example 5. 
1i-he number (r-1) may be thought of as a crossing index, since if we 
were to plot the two distributions X and Y with two curves they would cross. 
(r-1) times. [Cf. Table l.] 
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We may now state a general rule for rank preserving equalizations 
from X to Y for which Examp.e 5 ts an illustration: 
(a) Identify the groups accorcing to (2.6). 
(b) With each transfer, eliminate the gap between X and Y of one 
family's income by 
(i) Taking from the poorest family (the p'th) with non-zero din 
the richest group (Sr), 
(ii) Giving to the richest family (the q'th) with non-zero din 
the next lower group (Sr-1
), 
- ~--·
(iii) Compute the amount of transfer as the smaller of d and -d.1' ~ 
(c) Repeat these steps (a,b) again, each time eliminating the gap 
for another family's income. 
To prove the validity of this rule, we need to draw on the Lorenz 
domination condition of Theorem 2.1 by the following lemma. 
Lemma 2.3. Wh:n Xi Y, ½c ~ Ly is equivalent to (2.10.a) and (2.10.b): 
l. 
(2.10) (a) I d.
J -> 0 for i ·= l, ••• , n j = 1
p 
(b) I s. > 0 for p = 1, ... , r
Jj ; 1 
Proof: (2.3. a, b) ·imply (2.10.a). Conversely (2.10.a) implies (2.3.a) 
and, since Xi Y, it also implies (2.3.b). Thus, (2.3.a,b) and (2.10.a) 
are equivalent when X # Y. It follows directly from (2.8) that (2.10.a) 
implies (2.10.h). Thus we need only prove the reverse implication. Suppose 
Then de=inedi£ D = (da+l da+2 ••• da+m)q 
Q
i 
+ 1 + ••• + d ••vi = 
j 
; 1 dj = s1 + s2 + •• ~ + Sq-l + da 1 
We want to prove V. > O. In this expression,
.l -
(2.11) (a) + S l > O, (by (2.10.b))q- -
(b) S -= d + ••• + d , where all d's hav~ same sign, 
q a+l a+m q 
(c) V = S + S > 0 (by 2.10.b).a+m q-
a 
Thus, d. 1s one member of a sequence
.l 
(Va+l' Va+2 , ••• , Va+m) which either (i
) is monotonically increasing from 
q 
S > 0 if D is a positive set, or (ii) is monotonically decreasing to S+Sq .::_ O 
- q 
if D is a negative set. In either case, V. > O. Q.E.D. q l, -
Notice that (2.9.a,c) and (2.10.b) imply s1 > o and Sr< o. 
Thus (2.9.b) implies.r is even. Hence, 
Lemma 2.4. LX .::_ Ly implies r is even and the Si can be grouped into 
r/2 pairs with the indicated signs: 
+- +- -t -(2.12) (S1 s2 ) · (S3 s4 ) ••• (Sr-l Sr). 
This is illustrated in Example 5 where r=4. Then when LX ~ Ly, families in 
the last group S of X must be poorer than those in Y. The opposite r 
is true for the group S r-1 • 
Before we can prove the validity of this rule we need an additional 
lemma. In this lemma suppose Y' = (Y1 ' Y2' 
Y n 
') is obtained from Y by 
a si~gle rank-preserving equalization. Let 
Then, 
Lemma 2.5. If LX .::_ Ly, there exists Y' £ n0 such that: 
(2.14) (a) Y' = E(Y), 
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(c) d. = O implies d.' = O,
l. l. 
(d) there is at least one integer j such that d.J 
1 0 and d!
J 
= o. 
Proof: Suppose the last non-zero d.J. in S+r-1 
in {2.12) is dp and the 
first non-zero d. in S- is d {q > p). Thus, by this choice, we have 
i r q 
d =d = ... =d = o.p+l p+2 q-1 
Let 
(2.16) h =min {d , -d) =min {X - Y, Y - X) > O.p q p p q q 
Whenhis transferred from the q'th family to the p'th family of Y, let the 
result be denoted by Y'. Then obviously (2.14.a,c,d) are satisfied. To 
prove (b), we have 
l. 
< p or i~qfl+d2+ ... + d. for i 
t ••• + d(2.17) dl' + d2 + ... + d.l.' = <\ + d2 + ... + di -h = d1 + d2+ p-1+, 
for p ~ i < q. 
The first sum d1 + 
d2 + ••• +
di~ 0 by (2.10.a). In the second sum, 
d1 + d2 
+ ••• + dp-l is non-negative by Lorenz-domination (2.10.a) and 
t t t 
(dp - h) is non-negative because h ~ dp. Thus d1 + d2 
+ ••• + d.
l. -
> 0 
and LX ~ Ly' by (2.10.a). Q.E.o. 
-LelMla 2. 5 assures us that we can repeat t}:le same operation on Y' 
by reducing one additional non-zero entry of d'. Since there are only a 
finite number of non-zero d.l. we hav
e: 
Lemma 2.6. If 1x ~ Ly,' then there exists a sequence of transfers T 
such that X = T(Y) and T involves at most M steps, where Mis the number 
of non-zero di ind (as given by (2.5)). 
The proof of the sufficient condition of Theorem 2.1 follows directly 
from Lemma 2.6, as does the validity of the rule presented above. 
D. Application of Theorem 2.1 to Zones of Ambiguity 
When seeking to compare two distributions X and Y, we can use (2.12) 
to qevise a simple rule for determining when LX crosses Ly {i.e., when 
Xe M). Following (2.12), the rule is simply to examine 
the sign of the first and last non-zero di and, if they have the same sign, 
1
~orenz curves must cross. 
If there are n individuals, the total num::,er of possible ways in which 
' the d's can vary is 
n 2
P = 2 - 2. 
On the other hand, the number of cases when the rule applies is 
N = 2n-l - 2.3 
Thus, the ratio 
N _ 2n-l_2 1
p - + 2 
from below as n + m. When n is large, therefore, we can tell by inspec-
tion in roughly half the cases that the Lorenz curves cross. Small sample 
percentages are summarized in Table 2.
4 
1However, if they have opposi~sign, they may or cay not cross and 
it is necessary to compare the full distributions. 
2The two cases which are not possible are those in which all d's are 
either positive or negative. These are ruled out by the fact that 
t di= o.
3This is because in half of the total cases (2n-l) the first and last 
d's have opposite sign.
4In the case n=3, the P=6 cases correspond to the six regions of Figure 3 
(see Example 4). The N=2 cases correspond to M* and M*. The crossing indices 
r of the frequency distributions for the six cases are shown in Table 1. When 
r is odd. the Lorenz curves cross once; when even, not at all. 
• • • 
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TABLE 2 
n p N N/P 
2 2 0 0 
3 6 2 .33 
4 14 6 .43 
5 30 14 .47 
6 62 30 .48 
7 126 62 .49 
8 254 126 .so 
• • . • 
e 
• • . • 
3. Traditional Approach to Inequality Comparisons 
A. Inequality Indices 
The traditional approach for comparing the inequality of two distri­
butions is to compute an index of inequality I (i.e., a real-valued function 
with domain n+): 
(3.1) I= f(X) = f(X1 
x2 ••• Xn ), X.1 -> O. 
Examples of such indices are the Gini coefficient, coefficient of variation, 
range, and others which we-shall consider below. Whenever such an index 
is given, it naturally induces a complete pre-ordering R according to the 
following definition: 
Definition. Pre-Ordering Induced by an Index. A real-valued index 
of inequality I= f(X) induces a pre-ordering Ras follows: for all 
X, Y & n+, X G Y when f(X) ~ f(Y). 
1 
~ot ice that (3.1) measures inequality and therefore a more equal 
distribution has a lower index. 
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Notice that the cardinality of the index (3.1) is unnecessary for the q
uestion 
of determining which is the more equal of two distributions, since the 
.essential information for this purpose is all contained in the pre-orderin
g 
R which f(X) induces. 
It is the purpose of this section to show that the R's induced by 
many familiar inequality indices indeed satisfy the three axioms introduce
d 
in Section 1. We begin with two elementary ideas. The first is the 
equivalence of two cardinal indices: 
Definition. Equivalence. Two indices I1 = f 1{X) and I 2 =f 2(X) 
if and only if 
The second elementaryTwo equivalent indices obviously induce the same ordering. 
idea is that two indices are equivalent when one is a strictly monotonic trans­
formation of the other. Formally, 
e
Lemma 3·.1. I 1 = I 2 if and _o
nly if there exists a real-valued monotonic 
function g defined on the domain of real numbers such that I 2(X) = g
(I1(X
)) 
fw all x e: n+. 
When a particular index I= f(X) in (3.1) satisfies the restrictions 
specified below, the following th~orem insures that R satisfied Al-A3: 
Theorem 3.2 The pre-ordering R induced by an index I= f(X) satisfies 
Al-A3 when: 
(3.2) (a). Homogeneous of Degree Zero. f (X) = f(aX), a > O; 
(b). Symmetry. f(X. X. • • • xi ) = f(X1 x2 . . • X ),nil J.2 n
where (il, 
. , i ) is a permutation of (1,2, .. -, n);~~l.2' • • n-
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(c). Monotonicity of Partial Derivative. 
a~:= fi(X) < :~ = fj(X) for i < j and Xe: n0 • 
l. j 
(3.2.a) insures that the induced ordering satisfies Al.Proof: 
To show A3 holds on n0 ,Similarly, (3.2.b) insures that it satisfies A2. 
suppose Xis obtained from Ye: n0 by a r
ank-preserving equalization _(i.e., 
X = E(Y)) brought about by the transfer of a positive amount of 
income h 
from a relatively rich family j to a relatively poorer famil
y i. Then 
- h • • • 'Y
the difference I(X) - I(Y) is D(h) = f(X) - f(Y) = f(Y1 ... 
Y.
J. 
+ h ••• Y.
] 
••• Y ) , which is a function of h. Partially differen-- f(Y1 
••• Y. ••• Y..
1 J n 
3D(h)
tiating D(h) with respect to h, we have ah = fi(X) - fj(X
) 
Thus, A3 iswhich, when evaluated at X = Y, is negative by (3.2.c). 
satisfied in_n0• Q.E.D. 
B. ·Relationship between Inequality Indices and Al-A3. 
We now want to show that four of the most well-known indi
ces of in­
equality --- the coefficient of variation, the Gini coeff
icient, the Atkinson 
index, and the Theil index --- satisfy conditions (3.2) and 
hence Al-A3. 
Consider first the Coefficient of Variation: 
l: X./n.(3.3) C = C(X) = a/X where a = I ~ (X. -x)2/4 and X = i l.
J. l. 
Since both a and X are homoeeneous of degree one, C is homogeneous 
of degree 
To
zero and (3.2.a) is satisfied. Obviously, C also satisfies 
(3.2.b). 
verify that C satisfies (3.2.c), we state first 
Lemma 3.3. In n0 , the Coef
ficient of Variation C(X) is equivalent to 
C..~ = 82 + 82 + ••• + e







1 2 n 
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!!_O()f: In n0 , 8 = 1/n. Therefore, C( 9) =an= ✓t(8. - l/n)2l. . 
2 e 2I t(8. - 1/n) 1/n= re.. Q.E.D.
l.- l. 
., 41 ,,.,."'1sly satisfies (3.2.c). Since, by Lemma 3.3, C* and Care equivalent, 
, 1 -:JVS that C also satisfies Al-A3 in n0 • 
~ext, consider the Gini Coefficient ( G) defined for points 
':. 9 ••• 8n) e n • Such a point is represented by the curve f( 8)
2 0 
;.:l panel (b) of figure 5. The cumulative value of f ( 8) is the Lorenz 
~""·t :. shown in the unit square in panel (a). Formally, a Lorenz Curve is 
8 
• *,:-valued function defined on a finite domain (1/n 2/n 1). Thus, 
"' ·..:~nz CUrve for 8 is 
(3.4) L = e + e + ••• +er for r=l/n 2/n, ••• , r/n,8 1 2 
"""4 ~~ Gini coefficient· is defined as 
A 
( 3. 5) G = A+B , 
..,•.,.._. A and B are the areas indicated in Figure 5. It is clear that G 
. ·'.(.,
l .,..., ·:!ies (3. 2.a,b ). To verify that G satisfies (3. 2. c), we state first 
i.,, 
Lemma 3.~. In n
0 
, the Gini coefficient G(X) is equivalent to 
•· •i + 28~ + 3e; + ••• + ne!. 
Proof: G = A!B = 1-2B ~ (-B) where 
t ' 
· •' Clearly seen to satisfy (3. 2. c). Thus, following the same lines of 
,.. 't 
· ~"'nt as we used for the Coefficient of -Variation, G also satisfies Al-A3. 
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l 
Lorenz Curve (L) 
6 X 
(a} 
... i--·--·----··-----. . : -. 
















Another index which has recently been proposed is the Atkinson Index, 
defined as 
It is evident that (3.2.a,b) are satisfied by A. To verify that A satisfies 
(3.2.c), we first state: 




, X = 1/n. Therefore, 1 . 
1-£ 1-£ 1 1-£A= l-[[(n81 )
1
~£+ Cne ) +••• +(ne ) J - J
2 n n 
' 1 
af < !f._ 1"ff (1-£) e.-£ < (1-£) e.-ciff e. < e •. ae. ae. 1. J . 1. J 
l. J 
Thus, A satisfies Al-A3. 
2Another recently-proposed measure of inequality is the Theil Index 
1 1 · 1
(3.7) T = 1n n- [e 1n +e 1n + ••• + en tn en].1 281 82 
The Theil Index clearly satisfies (3.2.a,b). We now show: 
1 
see Atkinson (1970). 
2 see Theil (1967). 
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Lemma 3.6. In n0 , the T
heil Index Tis equivalent to T* 
1 n _l + - 1 ]Proof !I:= tnn - (81 .2.n 9l 
+ 82 •••
 + 8n tn 9
92 n 
1




82 • • • 8n 
8n
1 2 
... Q.E. D• 
It is obvious that T* satisfies (3.2.c) and therefore T s
atisfies Al-A3. 
C. Generalization 
Having observed several indices which satisfy the conditi
ons of Theorem 
3.2, we note that there are many other possible measures 
which also fulfill 
those conditions. Special cases of the general function 
of Theorem 3.2 take 
on the following additive form: af. af. 
+ f {X ) with -
1




a special case of which is 
G* is seen (in Lemma 3.4) to be a special case of {3.9), wh
ile 
C* (Lemma 3.3), A* (Lerrma 3.5), and T* (Lemma 3.6) are special
 cases of 
With the aid of {3.9) and {3.10), we can immediately gene
rate
(3.10). 
. a large number of other indices satisfying Al-A3, e.g., 









• < ~j for i < j 
~2£2 + 8 £ f 1<ci < cj(3.12) £ = 91£1 t ~ ••• + n n or 
which may conceivably help in mnstructing new measures with more desirable 
properties for empirical work. 
Despite the large number of indices which satisfy our three axioms, 
there are other indices in common use which violate them, particularly 
Al and A3. The difficulty with those indices which violate Al (e.g., variance) 
is sometimes stated as "not independent of the level of income," i.e. , having 
larger values for greater total incomes. Those indices which do not satisfy 
A3 are in some circumstances insensitive to rank-preserving equalizations. 
Examples are the family of fractile ranges such as the interquartile range; 
any rank-preserving equalizations within a segment (e.g., within a quartile) 
leave the index unchanged, in violation of A3. Another example is the Kuznets 
• 1
Ratio: 
Ka tie.l. . - 1/nl, 
which is unchanged by any rank-preserving equalization or disequalization on 
the same side of the mean. To the extent that Al-A3 are reasonable, all 
indices which violate them are less than satisfactory; their popular use in 
empirical work cannot be defended by these axioms and must be justified on 
other grounds. 
We now give an example showing explicitly the iso-inequality set and 
showing also where A3 is violated by the Kuzne1sratio. 
1See Kuznets (1957). 
-33-
Example 6. Kuznets Ratio for the Case n=3 
The six regions of the equilateral triangle for the three person case 
are reproduced in Figure 6. The dotted lines a'a'', b'b''. and c'c'' are 
drawn parallel to the three sides. In n (the triangle DC4>), to the right0
(left) of c'c'', the middle family's income is less (greater) than the mean 
incowe (= 1/3). Let x be a typical point in c'C4> through which a line vy1 
~s dr~wn parallel t~ AB. ~en x moves along vy1 , the Ku~n:ts ratio is 
invariant, because income is transferred beLween two families on the same 
side of the mean. That A3 is violated can be seen from the fact that the 
set x* (i.e., the point set bounded by xw4>v) now contains those points on xv 
which are not strictly more equal than x, and thus A3 is violated on xv. 
Similarly, for a typical point z. in the triangle c'D4>, the Kuznets ratio is 
invariant on the horizontal line segment uy and A3 is violated on uz. The1 
. complete pre-ordering induced by the Kuznets ratio is shown by the iso-inequality 
hexagon y1yif3y4y5y6• We note that if A3 is not to be violat
ed, the contours 




00 • 0(1,2,3) 
4., Conclusion 
In this paper, we have developed ~n approach to inequality compari­
sons which differs from the conventional cardinal one. Beginning by pos­
tulating three axioms, we showed that many but by no means all of the 
'lhe onescommonly-used cardinal inequality measures satisfy these axioms. 
which do satisfy the axioms agree on the ranking of distributions whose 
Lorenz curves do not intersect. However, when Lorenz curves do intersect, 
the various measures partition the income distribution space differently. 
Since the three axioms are insufficient to determine the specific partition 
to use, the use of any of the conventional measures implicitly accepts the 
additional welfare judgments associated with that measure. 
The key issue for inequality comparisons is the reasonableness of the 
ordering criterion, which in the case of.cardinal measures is the index it­
An axiomatic approach is probably the ideal method for confrontingselfe 
this issue, because the reasonable properties (i.e., the axioms) are postu­
lated explicit;y. At minimum, this approach facilitates communication by 
enabling (and indeed requiring) one to set forth clearly his own viewpoints 
and value judgments for scrutiny by others. But in addition, to the extent 
that one person's judgments (such as those in our three axioms) are acceptable
 
Weto others, controversies over inequality comparisons may be resolved. 
have seen that our three axioms are incomplete insofar as they cannot deter­
mine the ordinal ranking uniquely. A feasible and desirable direction for 
future research is to i~vestigate what further axioms could be introduced 
to complete the axiomatic system or at least to reduce further the zones of 
ambiguity. 
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Two of the properties we have postulated, scale irrelevance and sym-
metry (Al and A2), permit us to concentrate on the rank-preserving subset 
a 
O 
in our search for new axioms. When this is done, the ordinal ranking 
can immediately be extended to the entire income distribution space 
(Lemma 1.2). As an illustration of this procedure, the third axiom of our 
paper was first introduced on n0 and then exten
ded to n+ as a matter of 
logical deduction (Lemma 1.4). This same procedure can be followed in future 
research with two important advantages. First, as we showed in Section 3, 
a O is computation
ally more convenient than n+. Second, economists have 
long been aware of the fact that the interdependence of personal (or family) 
utilities is a vexing problem for social welfare judgments in general and 
inequality judgments in particular. It may be some consolation to know that 
inn 0 , ra
nkings are not disturbed, so one does not have to face the sensi­
tive issues associated with reversals of existing positions in the income 
hierarchy. 
It is conceivable that beyond some point the search for new axioms may 
turn out to be unrewarding, even on n 0• In 
that case, inequality compari­
sons will always be subject to arbitrary specifications of welfare weights. 
In this paper, we have presented new families of such arbitrary indices con­
(3.11) and (3.12)). The selectionsistent with our three axioms (see eq. 
of the proper weights ( A i and £ i respectively) by whatever reasonable 
criterion one cares to exercise is a less desirable but possibly more prac-
'
tical alternative than a strictly axiomatic approach. 
Our research has hopefully made clear that inequality comparisons 
cannot be made without adopting value judgments, explicit or otherwise, 
about the desirability of incomes accruing to persons at .different positions 
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Even the Lorenz criterion, which p
ermits us to 
in the income distribution. 
rank the relative inequality of dif
ferent distributions in only a fra
ction 
of the cases, embodies such judgme
nts. The traditional inequality in
dices 
such as those considered in Section
 3, to the extent they complete th
e 
These judg­
ordering, embody~ value judgme
nts beyond our three axioms. 
ments are at present vague, and it 
would be helpful if future researc
hers 
could state these implicit value ju
dgments in axiomatic terms so that
 when 
a particular inequality index is us
ed we will know exactly what judgm
ents 
are being madec 
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